Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan
Recent studies on the capacity of international organizations (IOs) to influence state behavior have explored their ability to shift public opinion, a crucial mechanism for changing state policies. While the IPE literature often focuses on conflicts between IOs and domestic leaders, cases where their interests align are understudied. We argue that leaders can leverage IO endorsements to increase support for controversial policies and deflect political blame, but that this strategy’s effectiveness depends on the perceived traits of the IOs. Our survey experiment in Japan demonstrates that leaders can cite IO endorsements to reduce opposition to a tax increase, a prototypical case of an unpopular but necessary policy to maintain social welfare programs. Additionally, we find that the effect of IO endorsements is strongest when respondents perceive the IO as reflecting their country’s interests, while perceptions of impartiality and expertise, often highlighted in the literature, are less significant. Our findings offer a new perspective on when IOs can influence public opinion and call attention to the positive consequences of the political bias of IOs.