Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan
Recent studies on the influence of international organizations (IOs) on state behavior have explored their ability to shape public opinion, a key mechanism for policy change. This paper explores an important extension of this mechanism: whether domestic leaders can proactively leverage IO endorsements to bolster support for controversial policies and deflect political blame. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we explore how this strategy’s effectiveness depends on the perceived traits of IOs, measured on multiple dimensions including favorability, neutrality, and expertise. Our findings demonstrate that citing IO endorsements reduces public opposition to a tax increase—a contentious, high-salience policy that many experts nevertheless deem critical for sustaining social insurance programs. Notably, the influence of IO endorsements is strongest when the IO is perceived as aligned with national interests, while perceptions of impartiality and expertise, emphasized in prior research, play a lesser role. These results offer new insights into the conditions under which IOs can influence public opinion and call attention to the potential advantages of perceived IO biases for domestic elites.